This study examines the pricing of high-LTV debt to determine whether state-specific default laws have an impact on the availability and cost of that debt. We develop a simple theoretical model that provides predictions concerning borrower and lender choice of mortgage terms under differing assumptions regarding state default regulations. We examine whether lenders rationally price loans to higher risk borrowers and whether borrowers in states that limit lender ability to seek default remedies pay higher credit costs. Our results indicate that lenders rationally price loans to higher risk borrowers for the most part; however, when we focus on smaller and smaller FICO scores buckets, the results indicate that the mean actual loan rates are higher than those predicted by our model. The results also indicate that state-specific default laws do have an impact on the price of credit. The results also show that there is a greater degree of error in the pricing of high LTV loans to low FICO borrowers than to high FICO borrowers.
Introduction
Debt usage contains important signals regarding borrower quality and thus reveals information. While the use of debt is widely recognized in the information asymmetry literature, unfortunately, few studies have tied the signaling aspect of debt usage to broader market conditions where legal restrictions and regulations also interact to determine optimal debt usage. Given the debate currently surrounding the issue of predatory lending practices, it is important for public policy analysts to understand the equilibrium tradeoff between debt amount and cost and the impact that the regulatory environment has on this tradeoff.
Several observations exist on the use of high debt levels. For example, in the residential mortgage market it is well understood that high loan-to-value (LTV) loans carry significant default risk. Traditional option pricing models, where default is endogenous and determined only by interaction of house value and interest rates, find that the default option value is significant when the LTV is greater than 100%.
1 As a result, high-LTV loans are usually junior debt with lower priority of claim on the asset, with the majority of high-LTV loans originated for the purpose of debt consolidation.
Furthermore, high debt levels are also correlated with the probability of bankruptcy.
Thus, high-LTV loans are often like unsecured debt or credit cards, and as a result, the equilibrium tradeoff between borrower credit signals, debt amount and cost, and regulatory environment should be most apparent in this market.
The goal of this study is to examine the pricing of high-LTV debt and determine whether state-specific default laws have an impact on the availability and cost of that debt. Thus, we begin with a review of the theoretical models of borrower choice of credit and credit availability. From this review, we develop a simple theoretical model that provides predictions concerning borrower and lender choice of mortgage terms under differing assumptions regarding state default regulations. Using the predictions as a guide for the empirical analysis, the study has three main objectives. This first is to determine whether lenders rationally price loans to higher risk borrowers. The second is to determine the impact of borrower protection laws on the price of credit and the third is whether borrowers in states that limit lender ability to seek default remedies pay higher credit costs.
The empirical findings will provide insights into the role of state specific default and foreclosure laws on the equilibrium supply of credit and its costs. These insights should enable policy makers to better assess the adequacy of current borrower protection laws with respect to the evolving high-LTV debt market. Furthermore, by recognizing the general equilibrium nature of the credit market, the analysis will provide policy makers with a solid framework for assessing the validity of the accusations of predatory lending within this market.
II. High LTV Mortgages
A variety of mortgages are originated in the U.S. that have different characteristics in terms of priority (first and home equity loans), loan-to-value ratio (LTV) and credit quality of the borrower (A-rated and B/C-rated borrowers). We would expect that the different mortgages would have different default rates as well as different prepayment rates.
For illustrative purposes, we compare the prepayment rates and 90-day delinquency rates for three mortgage products. The first mortgage product is a senior mortgage with low LTVs (80% and less). The second mortgage product is a home equity loan (which is junior in priority to the first mortgage). The third mortgage product is a high LTV second mortgage which is junior to the first mortgage and can have aggregate LTVs up to 125% of house value.
Chart 1 presents the prepayment rates on the three different mortgage products The RFMSI 1997-S5 first mortgage deal had the highest prepayment rates of the three mortgages. The Firstplus 1997-1 125 LTV loan deal had the lowest prepayment rates of the three mortgages. The TMSHE 1996-D home equity loan deal was in the middle of the other two loans in terms of prepayment speeds. Clearly, the Firstplus 1997-1 125 LTV had the desirable feature of having the highest interest rate (WAC = 14.11%) and the lowest prepayment speed (which would give investors a greater number of coupon payments at the highest rate of the three mortgages). The only negative to the Firstplus 1997-1 125 LTB loan deal would be delinquencies and default.
Chart 2 depicts the 90-day delinquency rates on the three mortgages over the same period of time. In terms of delinquencies, the RFMSI 1997-S5 first mortgage deal experienced the lowest 90-day delinquency of the three mortgage types during the December 1997 through August 2000 period. This is not surprising given that
Residential Funding has very high credit standards for the mortgages in their pool. The TMSHE 1996-D home equity loan deal, on the other hand, had the highest 90-day delinquency rate among the mortgage types while Firstplus 1997-1 125 LTV loan deal had delinquencies somewhere in between. While it seems perplexing that the 125 LTV deal (with a WLTV of 114.00%) actually had lower 90-day delinquencies than the home equity loan deal (with a WLTV of 72.60%), it is not really surprising. In order to convince investors to purchase mortgage-backed security deal with a WALTV of 114.00%, the 125 LTV loans usually require better credit scores for the borrowers in order to quell investor concerns regarding potential defaults.
Given that the Firstplus Financial 125 LTV mortgage has a higher interest rate than the Money Store home equity loan (and substantially higher aggregate LTV) yet a lower incidence of ex-post delinquencies, it is of interest to examine the role that the borrower's credit scores and LTV play in the determination of the 125 LTV interest rate.
In the next section, we develop a model that provides predictions concerning second loans amounts and costs given differences in state specific laws and regulations.
III. The Model
We begin by assuming a two-period model where the borrower has an initial income endowment of W 0 with an expectation that income in period one will be 1 W . For simplicity, we assume that the borrower utilizes period zero income and debt to finance consumption and enters into debt contracts to maximize period one total wealth (income plus assets). Lenders can verify the initial income endowment but are only able to observe an imperfect credit quality signal (θ) of the expectation of period one income.
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We assume that θ is distributed over the interval [0, 1] where larger values of θ signal higher expectations of period one income. 3 The borrower purchases a housing unit for V 0 at time 0 utilizing secured debt M to partially fund the purchase where M<V 0 and W 0 ≥V 0 -M. That is, we assume the initial income endowment is sufficient to cover the downpayment on the house. For simplicity, we also assume that the debt plus interest is due in period 1 and is denoted as M'=M(1+r m ).
In order to limit potential losses, the lender underwrites the mortgage loan by controlling the loan-to-value ratio (M/V 0 ) and setting minimum credit quality levels (θˆ).
The lender determines the LTV ratio based on period one expectations of property value
Thus, the lender determines the initial loan
2 Verification of borrower wealth at loan origination through examination of tax returns and bank accounts is common practice.
3 Typical credit quality signals (such as those compiled by Fair, Isaac & Co.) combine information regarding borrower income, assets, debts, and payment history into a numeric score that is predictive of borrower potential to default on future debt payments. 4 For high LTV levels (M/V 0 > 0.80), lenders require that borrowers purchase mortgage insuranceeffectively raising the cost of borrowing. 5 The condition that 1 V + 1 W >M' assumes that lenders believe that strategic default can be limited through enforcement of borrower deficiency judgments. We explicitly allow for this in the analysis below.
The borrower also finances non-housing consumption (C 0 ) by borrowing unsecured debt (P) that is also due in period 1 with the amount due denoted as P'=P(1+r p ). Since P is unsecured, the lender looks to expected period one income for repayment, and thus, the amount of unsecured debt available at period 0 is based on the expectation of income ( 1 W ) and the borrower's credit score. Since the credit score provides a signal of expected period 1 income, the higher the borrower's credit signal (θ), the greater the amount of unsecured debt made available. Given that mortgage debt has a senior claim to the period 1 assets and income, the interest rate on secured debt is lower than unsecured debt (r m <r p ). Note that if the lender is able to utilize risk-based pricing, then the interest rate and loan amount will be indexed to θ such that incentive to repay the debt and will default in every case with the uninteresting equilibrium result that no lender would enter into a loan contract.
We now consider the various borrower and lender period 1 payoff conditions assuming extreme values for γ. Figure 1 shows the payoff conditions for the secured and unsecured lenders as well as the borrower. In Panel A, we assume that γ=1 implying that the lenders are able to foreclose on the borrower's assets to satisfy an outstanding claim.
Case 1 shows the payoff positions when the total value of all assets is greater than the debt outstanding. In this situation, the borrower obviously pays off all loans and has a 7 Pence (2002) confirms this finding using HMDA loan level data. 8 As discussed by Berkowitz and Hynes (1999) and Lin and White (2001) , Federal bankruptcy law provides a homestead exemption of $7,500 but each state is allowed to set its own exemption level. As a result, individual state homestead exemption levels vary widely with some being unlimited and others being very restricted. Lin and White (2001) note that personal property exemptions have smaller variation across states.
positive wealth position. In Case 2, we show the payoff when the value of the house is greater than the secured mortgage debt, but period one wealth is less than the unsecured debt (W 1 <P'). As a result, the borrower defaults on the unsecured debt and the unsecured creditor's recourse is to seize the personal assets to satisfy the unsecured debt P'. Since the unsecured creditor is unable to attach the borrower's housing equity, the borrower's net period one wealth position is (V 1 -M') and the unsecured creditor suffers a net loss (P'-W 1 ). Finally, Case 3 considers the payoffs if the house value is less than the secured mortgage amount. This is the classic mortgage default condition triggered by negative equity. In this situation, the secured lender forecloses on the property and suffers a loss equal to M'-V 1 -W 1 . Nothing remains for the unsecured lender who thus suffers a loss of P' and the borrower's net period one wealth position is zero.
In Panel B, we show the period one payoffs assuming the borrower resides in a very low default cost state. We assume that the probability of foreclosing and receiving a payoff in the event of default is positive, but small. Again, Case 1 shows that the payoffs are the same as in Panel A since the borrower has no financial incentive to default.
However, in Case 2, the payoff to the unsecured lender is smaller since (W 1 )γ< W 1 and the payoff to the borrower is now (W 1 (1-γ)+(V 1 -M')). Thus, as the cost of default declines (costs to the lender associated with foreclosure increase), the borrower's expectation of keeping a portion of her period one wealth in the event of default increases. Finally, Case 3 shows that the unsecured lender's payoff is zero when default occurs on the secured debt since all assets that can be collected are used to payoff the secured lender's position.
Panel C shows the period one outcomes assuming that P is now financed with a secured second mortgage. The payoff conditions in Case 2 are altered to reflect the ability of the junior secured lender to seize part of the borrower's housing equity. Since
, the payoff to the secured second lender is greater than the payoff to the
The secured second lender's gain is directly offset by the borrower's loss; and, as a result, in states where borrower default costs are low, the unsecured lender has an incentive to entice the borrower to switch from unsecured debt to secured debt by offering more generous loan terms for junior secured debt than for unsecured debt.
The implications of our model with respect to borrower quality and loan amount contrast with the model predictions of Brueckner (1994 Brueckner ( , 2000 , who develops a simple two-period model of borrower default that examines the impact of borrower risk on choice of loan amount. Brueckner's model is based on default being triggered by declines in the underlying collateral asset value and his analysis implies that low risk borrowers self-select smaller loans while high-risk borrowers select larger loans. This result is based on the observation that default costs appear to be important in understanding the empirical incidence of default. Brueckner's model follows from the information asymmetry arguments first applied to the insurance market by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) . Rothschild and Stiglitz's (1976) analysis of the insurance market demonstrated that when insurers cannot discern risky applicants from non-risky applicants, the "safe" applicants signal their risk profile by applying for less insurance than the "risky" applicants. Similarly, Brueckner's model indicates that, in the presence of non-trivial default costs, only high-risk borrowers are willing to pay the premium for a high LTV ratio. shows that when default costs are high, risky borrowers choose low LTV ratios to minimize default costs. However, their model provides additional insights by indicating that when default costs are low, risky borrowers may actually choose higher LTV ratios.
To summarize, our analysis implies that borrowers in states with low default costs will have higher secured second loan amounts relative to borrowers in states with high default costs. Furthermore, our model also implies that secured junior loan amounts should be directly correlated with borrower credit quality since the lender looks to both the underlying collateral as well as future income for loan repayment. That is, our model predicts that higher quality borrowers will have higher loan amounts relative to lower quality borrowers. This is consistent with the predictions of Harrison et al (2002) and directly counters to the predictions of Brueckner (1994 Brueckner ( , 2000 . In addition, to the extent that lenders are able to differentiate borrower quality based on credit scores, we expect that loan costs should be negatively related to borrower credit scores.
IV. Data
In order to test the predictions from our model, we employ a dataset of 132,184 second mortgage loans originated for securitization between 1995 and 1999. This dataset is unlike most other mortgage datasets in that these mortgages represent second loans that are secured by the underlying property. However, in many cases, when the original mortgage loan balance is combined with the second loan amount, the total mortgage debt exceeds the value of the collateral asset. As a result, these loans are often referred to as "125% LTV" loans. The "125" designation denotes the fact that the maximum LTV ratio is normally 125 percent of the property collateral value. In order to make the dataset as clean as possible, we include only subordinate loans with single-family residential collateral. The dataset contains information regarding the borrower's reason for desiring the mortgage, allowing a test of whether loans originated for the purpose of "debt consolidation" differ from loans originated for other purposes (home improvement, refinancing, etc.). Given that deficiency judgments increase the risk to the borrower, the theory proposed by Harrison et al (2002) suggests that borrowers in states that allow deficiency judgments should self select lower debt amounts than borrowers in states that limit deficiency judgments, all else being equal. As a preliminary test of this hypothesis, we report in Table 3 the mean total debt loan-to-value ratio and senior debt loan-to-value ratios based on whether or not the borrower lives in a state that allows deficiency judgments. We find that borrowers in states that have do not allow deficiency judgments 11 The origination interest rate spread is defined as the mortgage contract rate at origination less the 10-year Treasury rate at date of origination. 12 Judicial foreclosure proceeding are more costly and time-consuming than non-judicial proceedings since creditors are required to obtain a court order to foreclosure on the property to satisfy the debt. Antideficiency judgment statutes prohibit creditors from attaching other assets or garnishing future wages to satisfy losses that occur due to default.
carry significantly higher senior debt amounts but lower total debt amounts than borrowers in states that allow deficiency judgments.
Since judicial foreclosure has the perception of providing greater borrower protection than non-judicial foreclosure proceedings, total debt amounts and junior loan amounts in states that require judicial foreclosure should be higher than in states that allow non-judicial foreclosure. Thus, Table 3 also reports the mean total loan-to-value ratios and senior loan-to-value ratio classified by state law regarding foreclosure.
Contrary to expectations, we find that mean senior loan-to-value ratios are significantly lower in states that require judicial foreclosure. 13 However, total debt loan-to-value ratios are higher in states that require judicial foreclosure. Since default costs are in general a zero sum game (borrower protections limit lender default recovery and pro lender regulations increase potential borrower losses), one possible explanation for this result is that lenders may ration credit in states where legal regulations limit lender abilities to quickly recover assets in case of default. Since most borrowers in default do not have other assets to attach, lenders may view deficiency judgments as less important than the ability to utilize non-judicial foreclosure proceedings.
When factoring borrower credit and information signaling, Harrison et al (2002) suggest that holding default costs constant, high quality borrowers in high default cost states self-select higher loan amounts while low quality borrowers self select lower loan amounts to minimize the potential cost of default. Therefore, we test whether higher risk borrowers select larger loans and whether higher risk borrowers in high default cost states select lower loan amounts, holding all else constant. Table 4 shows the differences in mean loan-to-value ratios based on whether the borrower's FICO score is greater than or less than the average FICO score in the sample. Consistent with our theory, higher quality borrowers do have significantly higher senior loan amounts. However, lower quality borrowers have higher loan-to-values based on total debt. This finding is inconsistent with the debt-signaling hypothesis proposed by Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) . Holding all else constant, Bolton and Scharfstein's (1996) theory is that lower risk borrowers will have larger second loans as they are in a position to take on more debt.
In the regression analysis discussed below, we test whether lenders price loans based on borrower risk and default costs. Merton (1974) predicts that borrower yield spreads are a positive function of total debt. In contrast, the model predicts that lenders will offer borrowers lower spreads to entice them to switch from unsecured personal debt to secured mortgage debt. This last test should provide insight into the question of whether lenders engage in predatory lending practices by charging interest rates unrelated to borrower credit risk.
V. Empirical Modeling
One of the primary problems with analyzing the impact of state level default costs on the availability of credit is the endogenous relationship between the mortgage loan terms, the loan amount, the collateral quality, and the borrower's credit quality. This endogenous relationship is widely recognized in the literature that examines borrower choice concerning loan amount and housing consumption. For example, Ambrose, LaCour-Little, and Sanders (2002) employ a simultaneous equations system to recognize the well-known endogenous relationship between LTV and house value. 14 However, our analysis is more complicated in that we examine the borrower's choice of junior loan debt and the impact of default costs on the availability and cost of that debt. In this context, the amount of housing consumption is already determined. Thus, the endogenous terms are related to the amount of the second loan, its costs (interest rate spread), and loan term, assuming that the borrower's house (collateral) value, credit quality and income are exogenous to the decision. Therefore, to control for this endogenous relationship we estimate the following system via non-linear three-stage least squares regression (3SLS): where Spread i is the second mortgage origination spread, loanamt i is the second (juniorsecured) loan amount, Term i is the term of the second loan, r mkt is the current mortgage rate as proxied by the Freddie Mac 30-year fixed-rate mortgage rate, r treas is the 10-year constant maturity treasury rate, yieldcurve is the market yield curve (10-year constant maturity treasury rate less the 1-year constant maturity treasury rate), creditspread is the bond market credit risk spread as proxied by the difference in the BAA and AAA corporate bond rates, FICO i is borrower i's credit score at origination, house i is the value of the house at second loan origination, firstmtgamt i is the first (senior) mortgage amount, debtconsol i is the percent of the second loan used for debt consolidation purposes, cashout i is the percent of the second loan that is taken as cash at closing, improve i is the percent of the second loan used for home improvement purposes, D is a dummy variable denoting states that allow lenders to pursue deficiency judgments against borrowers in default, J is a dummy variable denoting states that require judicial foreclosure proceedings, YrDUM is a series of dummy variables denoting the year of origination (1996-1999 with 1995 being the reference year), and QtrDUM is a series of three dummy variables denoting the origination quarter (the first quarter is the reference).
The origination Spread is calculated as the effective yield assuming a 10-year holding period less the 10-year constant maturity treasury rate. In calculating the effective yield, we include the impact of closing costs and points. Approximately 10% of the sample had missing or incorrectly coded closing cost amounts. Thus, we imputed the closing costs on loans with missing data using the mean closing cost amount for the top 75 percent of the sample. The dataset does not contain actual information about the points charged to borrowers; however, discussions with lender representatives indicate that the lender uniformly charged 8 points on all loans originated. Thus, in estimating the effective yield we also assume that 8 points were charged at origination.
Given the large number of observations available, we segmented the sample into an estimation subsample and a holdout subsample. The estimation subsample was created by randomly drawing 75 percent of the full sample with the remaining 25 percent held as the holdout sample. The mortgage spread system was estimated using the estimation subsample with the holdout subsample used for testing model fit and accuracy. Table 6 presents the non-linear 3SLS parameter estimates for the mortgage spread system. As expected, the estimated coefficients for loan spread, term, and loan amount indicate a negative relationship between loan amount and cost (loan amounts decline as the cost increases) and a positive relationship between cost and term and loan amount and term. Consistent with the model developed above, the parameter estimates show that borrower credit quality (FICO score) is negatively related to credit cost and loan amount.
That is, higher quality borrowers (higher FICO scores) have lower second loan origination spreads all else being equal. In addition, borrower credit quality is positively related to the mortgage term with higher quality borrowers selecting longer-term loans. This is counter to the debt-signaling hypothesis discussed by Flannery (1986) that higher quality borrowers are less susceptible to financial shocks and can thus borrower over shorter terms. However, our result is consistent with the Diamond's (1991) theory that low quality borrowers are unable to issue longer-term debt since lenders are unwilling to lend longer term. Furthermore, after controlling for other factors, the model parameter estimates indicate that higher quality borrowers actually have lower second loan amounts. This is counter to the simple comparison of means reported earlier. However, this result is consistent with Brueckner's (2000) theory that, in equilibrium, higher quality borrowers do not request larger loan amounts.
The model coefficients provide strong support for a positive relationship between borrowers in states that require judicial foreclosure proceedings and the second loan terms. The parameter estimates indicate that borrowers in states that require judicial foreclosure have higher second loan amounts, pay more for the loan (origination spread is larger), and borrower over a shorter term. However, we find the opposite effect for states that limit borrower deficiency judgments. The negative coefficients for deficiency judgments in the spread and loan amount equations indicate that borrowers in states that prevent lenders from seeking deficiency judgments have lower spreads and loan amounts. This is consistent with the theory that lenders tradeoff loan costs with loan amounts. The results are also consistent with the theory that lenders restrict credit in states with regulations that limit their ability to recover losses (anti-deficiency judgment statutes) whereas lenders do not restrict credit in states that simply increase the costs associated with default (require judicial foreclosure) but do not limit the lender's ability to recover losses.
The coefficients regarding the use of funds do not reveal a significant relationship between loan amount or cost and the percentage of funds used to consolidate other debts.
However, we do find that that the cost of second loan debt is significantly lower as the percentage of the loan amount used for home improvements or cash out increases. At the same time, borrowers seeking loans for home improvements or to cash out also have lower amounts.
Examining the other macro economic and borrower specific factors, we see that borrowers with higher house values have higher second loan amounts while borrowers with larger first mortgages have lower second mortgages. We also find that the cost of second loans is positively related to the mortgage market interest rate spread and the overall market credit risk premium (corporate bond credit risk spread). This is consistent with a number of previous studies who find that the mortgage market is integrated with the larger capital markets.
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VI. Model Predictions
In Table 7 we report the mean and median spread, second loan amount, and loan term prediction errors for the estimation sample using the parameter estimates reported in Table 6 . Since the mean prediction errors can be skewed by extreme outliers, we chose to focus on the median values. The first row reports the mean and median prediction errors (residuals) for the full sample. The median values indicate that the model tends to underfit the spread and overfit the loan amount and term. We next divide the sample based on borrower FICO score and note that the spread prediction error appears to be smaller for the low FICO sample (FICO scores less than 684). For the high FICO subsample, the predicted spread is 25 basis points lower than the actual while the median error for the low FICO subsample is only 0.76 basis points lower. We also estimate the impact of the borrower's reason for the originating the second loan. Analysis of the residuals indicates that the prediction error is highest for borrowers using at least 90% of the loan amount for debt consolidation (123 basis points for high FICO borrowers and 94 basis points for low FICO borrowers). 15 For example, see Gonzalez-Rivera (2001) and Kolari, Fraser, and Anari (1998) for example.
We also examine the prediction errors for high quality and low quality borrowers based on their state default regulations. We classify high default cost states (from the lender's perspective) as states that require judicial foreclosure proceedings (J=1) but do not allow deficiency judgments (D=1). Low default cost states are classified as those that do not require judicial foreclosure (J=0) but allow deficiency judgments (D=0).
Interestingly, we find that the spread prediction error is uniformly negative (model over predicts the spread) across all state default regulation categories for the high quality borrower subsample. However, the model appears to uniformly under predict loan costs for the low FICO subsample (errors are positive). In the final section of Table 7 , we highlight the prediction errors for high and low default cost states based on borrower quality assuming funds used for debt consolidation. The model errors are slightly greater for states with high default costs.
In Table 8 we assess the estimated systems predicted accuracy using the hold-out sample as an out-of-sample test. Predicted spread, loan amount, and term were estimated via Newton's method for each observation in the holdout sample using the parameter coefficients reported in Table 6 . Since this is an "out-of-sample" test, the mean prediction errors for the full sample are no longer zero. The results indicate that the system has a relatively high predictive accuracy. The mean spread error is 0.1 basis points and the median spread error is 12 basis points. As in Table 7 , we find that the model tends to over estimate the spread for high quality borrowers and under predict the spread for low quality borrowers. However, the degree of error is larger for high quality borrowers than for low quality borrowers.
By controlling for borrower risk characteristics, interrelated loan terms, market conditions, and state-level default laws, we are able assess the degree of under-or overpricing of junior secured mortgages. We create a series of hypothetical borrowers differentiated by risk and location. For example, we segment the holdout sample into very high and very low quality borrowers where very high quality is defined as any borrower with a FICO score above the 75 th percentile of the whole sample (FICO>706) and very low quality is defined as any borrower with a FICO score below the 25 th percentile of the whole sample (FICO < 658). Next we calculate the independent variable means for these high and low quality subsamples further segmented by whether their state requires judicial foreclosure (J=1) or does not allow deficiency judgments (D=1). Using the relevant mean values of these hypothetical borrowers, we then estimate predicted loan spreads, term, and amounts. Comparing these predicted values to the actual means for each borrower segment will allow us to quantify the degree of lender under or over pricing. Table 9 shows the comparison for borrowers living in high default cost and low default cost states. Consistent with the prediction errors reported above, we see that predicted as well as actual spreads are lower in low default cost states. However, it is interesting to note that low quality borrowers are consistently over-charged relative to the model predictions. For example, the interest rate charged on a loan to a low quality borrower living in a high cost state was, on average, 64 basis points higher than the predicted value. On the other hand, high quality borrowers living in states with high default costs were consistently under charged by 18 basis points, on average.
VII. Summary and Conclusions
The high LTV mortgage examined in this paper is an interesting twist on the home equity loan contract in that it has a higher interest rate and aggregate LTV than traditional home equity loans. As the market continues to grow for the various permutations of home equity loans, the impact of credit on mortgage rates becomes quite important (particularly when compared to conforming first mortgages purchased by the government sponsored agencies where credit risk is of little concern).
In this paper, we examine the pricing of high-LTV debt and determine whether state-specific default laws have an impact on the availability and cost of that debt. First, we find that lenders rationally price loans to higher risk borrowers for the most part;
however, when we focus on smaller and smaller FICO scores buckets, the results indicate that the mean actual loan rates are higher than those predicted by our model. Second, we examine the impact of borrower protection laws on the price of credit and if borrowers in states that limit the lender's ability to seek default remedies pay higher credit costs; we find that states that do not require judicial foreclosure and allow deficiency judgments on high LTV loans have lower lending rates (by about 33 basis points) than loans in states that require judicial foreclosure and do not allow deficiency judgments. Third, we find that there is a greater degree of error in the pricing of high LTV loans to low FICO borrowers than to high FICO borrowers. Stated in a different way, it is more difficult to explain the rate charged to lower credit risk borrowers in that the rates charged are higher than those predicted by our "rational" model of loan pricing. 
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